The purpose of this essay is to explore the nature of limits to cognition. Are the limits epistemic, are they irreducible, or both? For the purposes of this essay, "epistemic" refers to issues related to our thought processes and "irreducible" refers to randomness.
Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to explore the nature of limits to cognition. Are the limits epistemic, are they irreducible, or both? For the purposes of this essay, "epistemic" refers to issues related to our thought processes and "irreducible" refers to randomness.
Many of the essays in this series have addressed limits to cognition, focusing primarily on limits epistemic. In this essay I want to introduce the possibility that at least some of the limits we face are inherent in the universe as a result of the complexity of the universe and not merely the result of limits of our brains, individually and/or collectively.
First we will consider some aspects of our understanding of the concept of limits. Then we will review a little about how our brains evolved. We will then discuss epistemic limits. We will then review evidence that our brains are actually "hard-wired" to think probabilistically and review some precepts from complexity theory.
How do we understand the concept of limits?
As we learned in the previous essay on language, words are ambiguous and meaning becomes more restricted in context.
The word "limits" is no exception and can also refer to many ideas. Encarta World English Dictionary defines "limit" as "the farthest point, degree, or boundary, especially one that cannot or should not be passed or exceeded; the boundary or edge of an area, or something that marks a boundary or edge; a feature or circumstance that restricts what can be done."
Another point about language is that emotion is often attached to the meaning of a word. For example, in the essay in this series on "Evidence" [1] , it was pointed out that, although most of us assume, when we hear the word "evidence," that the bit of evidence must be true and unassailable, we apply that attribute -true unassailable -to the word, but in actuality, "evidence" is merely a term that can be applied to anything we want to persuade others to believe.
I believe that one attribute that we have a strong tendency to apply to the word "limit" is that of "not enough." We hear often about "limited resources." According to economists, an unlimited resource is one for which everyone could have as much as s/he wants if the item is free. Parenthetically, an important concept here is "wants," as opposed to "needs."
Clearly economists consider many everyday items to be "limited resources," since many people will say something like "I'll take ten -no I'll take a hundred -let's make it a thousand, why don't we."
But "limit," per se, does not necessarily imply that there "is not enough to go around." For example, mathematically,
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Essay | Dermatol Pract Concept 2012;2(1):13 "limit" means a value that will not be exceeded by a mathematical formula. For example, if we divide 1 by 2 and then divide that answer by 2 again and continue n times where n is a positive integer that approaches infinity, the answer approaches zero. But the answer never actually is zero and a mathematician can perform the operation an unlimited number of times because of the concept of "infinity." Any person can have as many as s/he wants of the numbers in that infinite series; but the ultimate answer does have a limit -zero.
I bring this last point up because, when we look more closely into cognitive limits, I do not want us to think automatically that there is some sort of limit to the number of "facts" that can ever exist -that some day someone will say, "Gee, everything that is to be known in the Universe is known." I think there is ample evidence that that day will not dawn. What does occur is that each time we think about some idea, we must define the problem, thus drawing a set of limits within which to consider that idea. But the number of ideas out there is infinite -without limit.
So what exactly is limited?
As Jacob Bronowski has pointed out in The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination [2] and as Lawrence Slobokin has pointed out in Simplicity and Complexity in Games of the Intellect [3] , it is necessary to "limit," that is to say, draw a set of boundaries, or describe a "frame of reference" from which to consider our problem. Without rules, we cannot draw any valid conclusions at all.
We are reminded by Godel that, in any consistent system, there are true things that we cannot prove and that, in an inconsistent system, we can "prove" anything. Every time we frame a problem, we do so in order to make that system consistent so that any conclusions we can draw will be valid.
What we are not limited in is our ability to reframe a problem; we can reframe a problem in innumerable ways. Then we are free to make new connections and gain new knowledge (as per Bronowski).
For decades, neuroscientists shared the problem "frame" of determinism. But when that frame was finally exited and the new frame, described by Glimcher and discussed later in this essay, of game theory or neuroeconomics, it became possible to draw new conclusions about mechanisms of human thought.
We must be mindful of the problem, discussed in earlier essays in this series, of "authority." We must learn from authority, but we must not be bound by authority. As Feyerabend has pointed out in Against Method [4] much can be gained and learned by considering new data in the context of multiple possible theories in order to avoid being bound by a charismatic or dogmatic authority.
Glimcher [5] has referred us to the work of David Marr, who has insisted that the best way to work through neurophysiologic problems is to consider the goal of a behavior.
epistemic limits
In this series of essays we have discussed that our ability to think is limited in a number of ways. For one thing, we can only consider a certain number of items at any one time -those items we can "juggle" in Working Memory. For another thing, we must define each problem before we can think about it -we draw boundaries that define the problem, excluding necessarily items that we deem "irrelevant" to the problem at hand. Also, we define certain rules that pertain to the problem, and must hold to those rules while considering the problem, since those rules constitute part of the boundary of the problem. As Jacob Bronowski has pointed out in
The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination, it simply is not possible to consider the entire universe as "the problem"; we must carve out a small part of it at any one time.
We think if we can frame a problem just right -that is, if we ask the right question in the right way, all will become clear and all puzzlement will dissolve into a universal truthlike the Buddha's Enlightenment. But this feeling of "surety" is merely a trick of the brain.
David Gamez, in What We Can Never Know [6] , posits that many of our attempts to explain and make sense of the world are in essence Hermeneutic circles. Encarta World English Dictionary defines "hermeneutic" as "serving to interpret or explain something." "Hermeneutics," then, is the "science and methodology of interpreting texts [or bodies of thought, or theories]." A key point brought out by Gamez is that the interpreter or explainer cannot interpret or explain without him/herself being part of the world or theory being described. All stable hermeneutic circles, as Gamez calls them, are necessarily self-reflexive and must be able to explain how the person could create the theory in the first place. This sets us up for paradox that might arise from using self-reference unwisely, as discussed in more detail in the essay in this series on Language.
Additionally, a concept that is pretty much accepted is that none of us really "knows" what our world is like. Everything we sense is interpreted by our brain, and our brain has no mechanism for experiencing the world directly. The theory is usually referred to as the "brain-in-a-vat" theory. The theory asserts that our reality is merely a "virtual reality" constructed by our brain. Gamez's "dream" is that of one's experience with a phantom limb following amputation. Gamez goes on to point out that amputees often experience a vivid phantom. The brain "expects" certain events and fills them in. The brain itself is intact and all the "hardware" of the sensory and motor cortex assigned to the now absent limb is still present and operating. In the essay in this series on Patterns, we looked at the work of Erich Harth, who discussed how the brain can "augment" certain "perceived" features, but that our experience with our actual senses usually allows us to determine "reality" from the construct. Harth points out that we rarely hallucinate when we are awake, alert, and observant. Jeffrey Schwartz, in The Mind and the Brain [7] , discusses that the brain exhibits "neuroplasticity." Pathways that are used often, such as practicing a musical instrument or sport, are reinforced, adding new neurons to the pathway, while pathways not used atrophy, such as after a stroke.
I think there may be no way around understanding our world as a sort of "virtual reality." The question, I think, is whether we should allow ourselves to become paralyzed by this very realistic view of our existence.
As Gigerenzer has pointed out in Adaptive Thinking [8] and some of his other works, we humans have co-evolved with the world and, whatever "reality" is out there as viewed from the nonexistent "ultimate frame of reference," we perceive the wave-lengths of light we need to perceive to survive and can solve problems well enough to survive in the world as it "exists." What matters then is, given our starting point (our "virtual reality"), where can we go from here?
And an important part of the plan is to ensure that we define whatever frame of reference we are using at the time in a consistent way and that we strive to ensure inter-and intraobserver agreement.
Background -evolution
Gary Marcus, in Kluge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind [9] , points out that evolution works with what is available at the time and "experiments" through mutation, seeing what ends up fitter than others, the fitter thus producing more progeny and continuing the process through time. Parenthetically, "kluge" is a "clumsy or inelegantyet surprisingly effective -solution to a problem." Marcus avers that biology is loaded with kluges. He mentions that the human spine is not the most efficient way to support load in an upright two-legged creature; yes, our hands are free, which aids survival, but we are prone to develop back pain. We evolved from quadripeds, so we are stuck with having one column to support our upper bodies instead of the more efficient (from an engineering point of view) four equal cross-braced columns. He continues with another anatomical kluge -the human eye. The retina "is installed backward … leaving us with a pair of blind spots." Says Marcus, "nature is prone to making kluges because it doesn't 'care' whether its products are perfect or inelegant.
If something works, it spreads. If it doesn't work, it dies out.
Genes that lead to successful outcomes tend to propagate; genes that produce creatures that can't cut it tend to fade away; all else is metaphor. Adequacy, not beauty, is the name of the game."
Marcus mentions instances of the sublime in evolution.
"The human retina can detect a single photon in a darkened room…spider silk is stronger than steel and more elastic than rubber… hemoglobin is exquisitely adapted to the task of transporting oxygen …" He points out that "sometimes elegance and kluginess coexist, side by side. Highly efficient neurons…are connected to their neighbors by puzzlingly inefficient synaptic gaps, which transform efficient electrical activity into less efficient diffusing chemicals, and these in turn waste heat and lose information." He mentions, using the analogy of hill-climbing mentioned in the essay in this series on reasoning, that the vertebrate eye is elegant in its capacity to focus and adjust to varying amounts of light and "operates with more sophistication than most digital cam-
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Essay | Dermatol Pract Concept 2012;2(1):13 eras," but it is hobbled by the construction of the retina with its blind spot. "On the highest peak of evolution, our eyes would work much as they do now, but the retina would face forward (as it does in the octopus), eliminating those blind spots. The human eye is about as good as it could be, given the backward retina, but it could be better -a perfect illus- Marcus opines that kluges give us both insight into our evolutionary history and clues to how we can improve ourselves.
Marcus states of human memory, "Memory is, I believe, the mother of all kluges, the single factor most responsible for human idiosyncrasy. Our memory is both spectacular and a constant source of disappointment … Our memory is prone to distortion, conflation, and simple failure."
He compares human memory to that of the computer, finding our human memory to be "fragile," yet that of the computer "robust." He points out that computer programmers have constructed a computer's memory to be "postalcode"; each bit of information is assigned a specific location in the databank. Our memory is "contextual." Says Marcus "…we pull things out of our memory by using context, or Marcus admits that no one knows for sure how the human brain recalls items into current thought; he opines that the process is autonomous. In the first essay in this series we noted that Karl Lashley had observed that one is never conscious of the process of thinking; one is only conscious of the product that one has thought.
A Knowledge Products audio-course I once listened to about complexity points out that complex systems must have a way of getting rid of waste as a means of adapting to change. Perhaps, therefore, it is a good thing that we do not remember everything. Useful things are likely to occur commonly and we are likely to remember items that will be utilized. As Marcus points out, we have evolved to have context-dependent memory, thus it must have served us fairly well to date. Besides, we have constructed computers and developed libraries to hold "memories" for us and to document our history.
Because our memories are inexact at times, and because we do not know everything, our brains do not have access in a timely manner to all answers; therefore, we must have some sort of game plan for solving problems under the condition of uncertainty.
Probability Theory was developed, beginning in the mid 1600s. But is that theory just a "frame of reference" constructed by humans to deal with uncertainty? Or could a method for dealing with "probability" actually be built into our brains? We have discussed in earlier essays in this series, including Evidence, the work of Gerd Gigerenzer, who has concluded that "logic" is not the natural thought pattern of humans. Humans have, rather, developed "fast and frugal heuristics" to deal with most day-to-day problems. However, it turns out that, although we do not naturally think "logi- Glimcher posits that limitations to thought are unavoidable because randomness is an inherent property of the universe. He opines that from the earliest study of the mechanisms of human thought, the underlying, often not explicitly stated, concept was that of determinism.
Furthermore, he suggests that the very method of study actually requires that the world be deterministic. He points out that during the period of history known as the Enlightenment, it was recognized that there were limitations to existing knowledge. In order to eliminate the gaps in knowledge, a method of describing the world and for testing the accuracy of descriptions was developed, which we know as the "scientific method." The scientific method was rooted in the most logically rigorous system of thought available at the time -analytic geometry, developed by rene Descartes. The whole premise underlying the scientific method is that the world is deterministic and that it is possible to develop models/descriptions of the physical world that are predictivethat correct models will predict the future. Analytic geometry is a determinate mathematical system; thus, states Glimcher, "…[there was] a significant bias in the way that scientists thought about the world. Believing that the future state of the world could be predicted with analytic geometry not only implied that the world was deterministic, it also rested on the assumption that the world must be deterministic." So, from the time of the Enlightenment, we have been caught up in a paradox related to self-reference.
Slowly, over time, various scientists and mathematicians have chipped away at the assumption to end all assumptions -that the world is deterministic. Probability theory was developed. Godel's theorem proved that in a consistent, closed system (and all systems we define to study are closed) items that were true in that system could not be proved in the system as defined. Game theory was developed. Economics, especially classical economics, assumes that humans, but also other organisms, choose to maximize their "take." However, taking into account the constraints of evolution -that the organism is fittest that has the best apparatus at the time for dealing with the environment as it is at the time and that, referring to the hill-climbing analogy described in the essay in this series on Patterns, many "peaks" climbed may be local peaks and not the highest peak -"no actual neural system could ever achieve any computational goal with 100 percent efficiency." Additionally, as we will see, it behooves an organism to "test" the system periodically to ensure that a new paradigm is, or is not, preferable to the current favored choice. potential food item, the time required to obtain it, and the scarcity of that type of prey. Once an animal has begun to eat an item, it must decide when to stop eating it. Theorists hypothesize that there must be a theory of predation. "Optimal predation is the process of achieving a maximum rate of energy intake with a minimal expenditure of effort in a random and unpredictable world." Attempts have been made to determine the most efficient predation strategy for any animal, using mathematical tools to formalize such strategies.
Glimcher describes an experiment performed by Krebs and colleagues in the mid 1970s, testing the foraging efficiency of titmice (a type of bird). Titmice like to eat mealworms. The test system was such that a hungry titmouse was placed in a one cubic meter cage, beneath which a conveyor belt was running, carrying mealworms. There was a hole cut in the bottom of the cage and the titmouse would sit on a perch conveniently placed so that the titmouse could see anything passing by on the conveyor belt. The investigators made "standardized" mealworms by cutting up mealworms.
"Large" mealworms consisted of eight body segments from the mid portion of a mealworm and "small" mealworms consisted of four segments. Five foraging situations were devised to test the titmice. In condition A, large and small mealworms were placed independently on the conveyor belt, but each appeared once every 40 seconds such that large and small meal worms were encountered at a rate of about once every 1.5 minutes. In condition B, the worms were encountered with equal frequency, as in A, but the rate doubled to one encounter every 20 seconds. In conditions C, D, and E, the large worms appeared every 6.5 seconds, but the small prey rate was varied to between once every 3.5 seconds to once every 20 seconds. An underlying hypothesis held by the investigators was that the large mealworms held for the titmice twice the value of the small mealworms.
The scientists considered it likely that birds that handled small prey the fastest, would always take all prey because the highest rate of energy intake would be achieved by taking all prey, large and small -the birds were fast enough to not miss any worms going by on the conveyor belt. Slower birds, on the other hand were predicted to take only large prey once the large prey was available more often than every 7-8 seconds. It was thought that the slow birds would ignore the small mealworms in conditions C, D, and E.
When the experiment was run, the fast birds were unselective, as predicted. Also, the slow birds did show a preference for the large worms once they were available every 6.5 seconds, and this included the condition in which the small worms were available more often.
Another hypothesis Krebs wanted to test was the socalled "zero-one" rule. This rule stated that, if the prey is worth eating, it is worth eating all the time, and if the prey is not worth eating, it would never be eaten. In conditions C, D, and E, it was observed that the slow birds, although selective, took the large worms only about 85% of the time; they took the smaller worms occasionally. Krebs hypothesized that the birds would occasionally take small worms to update for themselves an internal estimate of the relative profitability of the two prey types, the rationale being that the birds recognize that situations change in "the real world," and it is prudent to "keep up with the times" so to speak. Alternatively, it may be, considering the process of evolution as described by Marcus, the birds may be unable to behave "optimally."
Glimcher describes his own work using the visual system of rhesus monkeys. Visual information is received by right and left retinas, which process the information somewhat and send the information via the optic nerve to the neurons of the Lateral Geniculate nucleus (LGn). The structure of the LGn is such that each location in the nucleus is specialized to monitor a specific position in the visual world. The geniculate maps then project to specific areas of the visual cortex, these areas also being topographically organized.
Within each topographic area, some neurons respond to vertical information, some to tilted information, some to colors, and so on. The retinotopic map projects to area V1 in the visual cortex, and sends information to other areas such as V2, V3, V4 and MT; there are more than 30 mapped areas that each contribute to our perception visually of the world. The actual studies consisted of rewarding monkeys with Berry Berry Fruit Juice whenever they learned specific visual saccade tasks. Electrodes were placed in specific neurons in the monkeys' brains to see when these neurons were active relative to the portion of the task they were performing. The monkeys would stare at an oscilloscope screen and look for the appearance of a stimulus/point. The tasks would vary.
Sometimes the monkey was supposed to stare at stimulus, but move his/her focus to a second point on the screen when it appeared. Sometimes the monkey was to ignore the appearance of the second point (continuing to stare at the first point). Sometimes the monkey was to move his/her gaze to point two after point one disappeared from the screen.
Sometimes the monkey would have to remember where the extinguished point was and return his/her gaze there after a delay of a second or two. And so forth. In each study, the monkey had to figure out what s/he was supposed to do by finding out whether his/her behavior was rewarded by juice.
Essay | Dermatol Pract Concept 2012;2(1) Glimcher then moves to the subject of game theory.
"Game" in "game theory" refers to all interactions between intelligent competitors. Von neumann and Morgenstern developed the concept, trying to develop a mathematical system that would describe how an actor in a "game" would make choices to obtain the best possible outcome for himself "given that his opponent or opponents were also attempting to obtain the best possible outcome for themselves." John nash developed the mathematical formulas that describe the "nash Equilibrium" point, for which either choice has the same value to the chooser. Page refers to adaptability in systems as "nonstationarity." returning to the "hill-climbing" analogy referred to earlier, in a stationary system, a landscape might be referred to as "rugged." Some hills are higher than others, but the height of them does not change -they remain stationary. Page introduces the concept of "dancing" landscapes. In dancing landscapes, the hills actually change heights. Those hills are not stationary. The heights of the hills in a dancing landscape adapt according to influences.
Conclusion
I think it is clear from the discussion above that there are epistemic limits to cognition. I think it is equally clear that there are limits to cognition that are due to randomnessrandomness generated in the complex adaptive system in which we live.
From the work of Glimcher, Marcus, and Page we can see that intelligence, including human intelligence, has evolved in an adaptive/dancing landscape and that we have developed a hard-wired capability to assess issues of probability and to deal with uncertainty, coping as we must with intelligent adapting beings.
As Glimcher pointed out, until fairly recently humans have assumed the existence of determinism, relegating all feelings of uncertainty to the realm epistemic. Determinism, however, assumes stationarity. I think there is ample evidence, via complexity theory, that our world exhibits features of nonstationarity.
Our task, then, is to embrace the concept of nonstationarity and to reconsider as much as possible what we think we have already learned from this new perspective.
Harth, as discussed in more detail in the essay in this series on Patterns [11] , has described that when we look for something, our brains are likely to "see" the item, enhancing some features of what we are looking at to meet our expectations. He also points out that we use our senses to evaluate the object and to "rein in" our imaginations, informing our brain that what we really see is not the "coin in the sand at the beach" we are looking for, but merely a piece of shell. We rarely hallucinate.
Our senses serve as a sort of "tether" to reality. When we learn to evaluate patients in medical school and residency and to use various instruments to extend our native human abilities and to interpret histologic sections during our pathology training, we rely on our mentors to say "yes, that is the rash of dermatitis herpetiformis" or "no that is not invasive cancer because..." Each of us needs some sort of tether to reality, just as we need our senses to keep our brains from hallucinating. I think our next task is to improve the way we as individuals interact so that we, collectively, can define new frames of reference from which we can gain new knowledge. We Essay | Dermatol Pract Concept 2012;2(1):13 73 must learn about and understand how our brains work as well as how complex systems work and use this knowledge to further our understanding of the world. While we will never escape the epistemic limit to cognition imposed by the "brain-as-virtual-reality-only" or "brain-in-a-vat" point of view, I do not think this should limit our progress very much.
After all, we have co-evolved with our environment to sense the items we can sense and we are surviving.
Summary
Evidence exists that there are limits to cognition. Some limits are the result of our embodiment whereby our brains have no direct experience with the world; all experience is via the senses and all input is processed in some way by the brain before we become conscious of a thought. Other limits are due to the nature of the world itself; the world being a complex adaptive system. However, although limits exist, there are still an infinite number of thoughts and hypotheses about the world we can entertain by viewing each body of data from multiple points of view and by helping each other to discern a collective reality, about which can draw conclusions, and from which, we can progress as a species, understanding more fully how we exist and evolve in the complex adaptive system in which we live.
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